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Sammendrag 
To viktige spørsmål for utformingen av uføretrygden er i hvilken grad ordningen reduserer 
tilbøyeligheten til å jobbe, og hva forsikringsverdien av ordningen er for individer og deres familier. 
Disse spørsmålene motiverer en deskriptiv analyse der vi følger søkere som får avslag og innvilget 
uførestønad, før og etter vedtak. Vi viser hvordan deres arbeidsinntekt, disponibel inntekt og konsum 
utvikler seg rundt søknadsvedtak. Vi finner at mange som får avslag på søknad går tilbake i jobb. 
Videre viser vi at husholdningenes disponibel inntekt og konsum i liten grad er avhengig av om 
søknaden om uførestønad blir innvilget eller avslått. Vi tolker disse deskriptive resultatene i lys av to 
alternative empiriske metoder. Analysen benytter et paneldatasett av alle søkere til uføretrygd over 
perioden 1998-2003. 
 
1 Introduction
Over the past 50 years, disability insurance (DI) rolls have risen dramatically in many OECD
countries. In the U.S., the participation rate has increased from less than 1% to over 5% of the
adult population. In many European countries, the increases are even more striking, from 1% to
7% in the U.K and from 2% to almost 10% in Norway.
Two key questions in thinking about the size and growth of the DI program are to what extent it
discourages work, and how valuable the insurance is to individuals and families. These questions
motivate our paper. We begin by describing the earnings, disposable income and consumption of
awarded and rejected DI applicants, before and after the disability onset and the allowance decision.
Next, we discuss alternative interpretations of these descriptive results, either through the lens of
the approach taken in Bound (1989) or as a difference-in-differences analysis. The key to our study
is that we can link a number of data sources from Norway, providing a population panel data set
with detailed information about every individual and household.
2 The disability insurance program
The Norwegian disability insurance (DI) program1 is designed to provide partial earnings replace-
ments to all workers under the full retirement age who are unable to work because of a medically
determined physical or mental impairment that has lasted for at least a year. The program also
provides benefits to individuals who have a permanent partial disability, allowing them to combine
disability benefits and part-time earnings. The level of DI benefits received is determined using
a formula based on an individual’s earnings history, and the proportion of income replaced is de-
creasing with past earnings so that low-wage workers replace a larger fraction of their earnings than
do high-wage workers.
When an individual submits an application for DI benefits, it is reviewed by disability examin-
ers. These examiners take into account health status, age, education, and work experience as well
as the transferability of the applicant’s skills. If the examiner concludes that the applicant cannot
be expected to engage in any substantial gainful activity, a disability award is made. During the
period we consider, a majority of claims were awarded by the disability examiners. If the DI claim
is denied, the individual may appeal the decision or reapply at a later time.
1We refer to Kostol and Mogstad (2014) for a detailed description of the Norwegian DI program.
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3 Data and sample selection
Our analysis uses several data sources, which we can link through unique identifiers for individuals
and households. Taken together, they provide a population panel data set with information for
every individual and household about their demographic characteristics (including age, gender, and
number of children), disability application process (such as disability onset, impairment, allowance
and rejection decisions), and socio-economic data (including education, earnings, cash transfers,
disposable income, and consumption measures). Details about the data sources and each of the
variables are given in the appendix.
We consider individuals who apply for DI benefits during the period 1998-2004. This sample
restriction allows us to observe applicants and their families for at least five years before and after
the allowance decision. We exclude individuals who were older than 62 years at the allowance
decision. The reason for this age restriction is to avoid program substitution between DI and old-
age retirement schemes. Following von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011), our main analysis
excludes rejected applicants who reapply within ten years of their denied DI claim. This sample
restriction helps in interpreting the changes in earnings over time, as denied applicants who reapply
have incentives to stay out of the labor force to signal disability. In the appendix, we show that
our main findings are robust to this sample restriction. The appendix also documents the key
characteristics of our sample of awarded and rejected applicants.
4 Graphical evidence
Figure 1 provides a descriptive look at the data by plotting economic outcomes of awarded and
rejected DI applicants, before and after the allowance decision. In the appendix, we provide figures
which compare the economic outcomes before and after disability onset. The trends are broadly
similar.
Graph (a) displays annual earnings of awarded and rejected applicants. Prior to the allowance
decision, those who are awarded benefits have higher earnings than their denied counterparts. By
the year of decision, earnings of awarded and denied individuals are fairly similar. Five years after
the decision, average earnings of those allowed is $6,200 while average earnings of those denied is
$25,500. Differences in earnings between those awarded and those denied emerge rapidly, and are
quite stable 3-5 years after the decision.
In graph (b), we show yearly DI benefits and total cash transfers (including DI benefits) of
awarded and rejected DI applicants. On average, awarded applicants recieve $22,000 in DI benefits.
However, rejected applicants are more likely to apply for and get on other transfer programs, after
their DI claim is denied. This program substitution attenuates the loss of DI benefits, giving a
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difference of $10,400 in total cash transfers between those allowed and those denied five years
after the decision.
Graph (c) and (d) present the evolution of disposable income and consumption of awarded and
rejected applicants at the household level (per capita). Our measure of disposable income is net
of taxes and includes earnings, income from self-employment and capital, and cash transfers of all
household members. As a result, it incorporates that spouses (or other household members) may
respond to the allowance decision, by changing their labor supply or by applying for their own
benefits. Our measure of consumption comes from the accounting identify that total expenditure in
a period is equal to to income and the change in wealth across the period.
Figure 1: Economic outcomes of awarded and rejected applicants, before and after DI decision
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(c) Household disposable income
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(d) Household consumption
Household variables are per capita, and nominal values are deflated to 2005, represented in US dollars using the average
exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
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The difference in disposable income between those awarded and those denied is about $6,000,
and changes little around the time of the allowance decision. As shown in the appendix, this is
in part because rejected applicants increase their earnings after the DI claim is denied, but also
program substitution and spousal responses seem to play a role. Both rejected and awarded appli-
cants have relatively low levels of (liquid) assets, and total expenditure follows closely disposable
income.
5 Interpreting the evidence
Table 1 presents the regression counterpart of the graphical evidence reported in Figure 1. In both
the pre and post periods, we take five-year averages of the outcomes. In the appendix, we show
that the regression results change little if we control for a wide range of observable characteristics,
such as age, gender, education, marital status, and the type of disorder. We now discuss how the
regression results can be interpreted through the lens of two alternative empirical approaches.
Bound approach. We begin by following the approach of Bound (1989). He uses rejected ap-
plicants as a control group for awarded applicants, and considers the post-decision labor outcomes
of those who are denied as an (upper bound) estimate of the counterfactual labor outcomes of those
who are allowed. Recent studies have extended this analysis, in part by analyzing different time pe-
riods but also with quasi-experimental variation in the disability determination process to improve
the comparability of rejected and awarded recipients.2 To date, the existing research focuses on the
labor market impact of DI allowance, and little is known about the consequences for disposable
income and consumption.3
The first column of Panel A shows that rejected applicants have much higher earnings than
allowed applicants in the five years after the decision. In the Bound approach, this difference
suggests substantial earnings capacity of allowed applicants. By comparison, the first column of
Panel B compares the cash transfers of denied and allowed applicants in the five years after the
decision. Interpreting the cash transfers of those who are denied as an estimate of the counterfactual
cash transfers of those who are allowed, suggests that total transfer payments increase considerably
if an individual is awarded DI. In contrast to earnings, the transfer payments are either nontaxable
or taxed at a low rate. The last two panels of Column 1 compare five-year averages of household
disposable income and consumption of awarded and rejected applicants. In the Bound approach,
these estimates suggest a 26 (19) percent gain in income (consumption) from being allowed DI.
2See e.g. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011), Maestas, Mullen and Strand
(2013), French and Song (2014), and Dahl, Kostøl and Mogstad (2014).
3Two notable exceptions are Meyer and Mok (2013), who document changes in income and consumption that follow
self-reported health changes or disability, and Low and Pistaferri (2012) who provide simulations from a calibrated a
life-cycle model to compare the insurance value and incentive costs of DI benefits.
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Table 1: Awarded and rejected applicants: Differences and changes in outcomes ($1,000)
Difference Changes in outcomes Difference-in-differences
Post Post decision - Post decision - Post decision -
decision pre decision pre onset pre decision pre onset
Estimation sample:
Allowed applicant: ! ! ! ! !
Rejected applicant: ! ! ! ! !
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual:
A: Earnings -14.17 -26.91 -2.32 -36.18 -4.63 -24.59 -31.55
(0.16) (0.06) (0.16) (0.07) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20)
B: Transfers 9.83 18.63 4.98 24.10 8.26 13.65 15.85
(0.12) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
Household (per capita):
C: Disposable income 6.56 0.74 0.58 0.36 1.05 0.16 -0.68
(0.10) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
D: Consumtion 5.41 1.93 1.43 2.43 2.32 0.50 0.11
(0.15) (0.04) (0.14) (0.05) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
Observations 141,370 258,839 26,097 242,130 25,253 284,936 267,383
This table shows differences in mean outcomes across the groups of allowed and rejected applicants; within group
changes in outcomes before and after decision, and difference-in-difference across groups and time. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the individual level. Household variables are per capita,
and nominal values are deflated to 2005, represented in US dollars using the average exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
Difference-in-differences. Although the estimates in Column 1 change little if we control for
observable characteristics of awarded and rejected applicants, the stark differences in their pre-
application earnings profiles raise concerns about selection on unobservables. Columns 2-5 docu-
ment the changes over time in the outcomes of awarded and denied applicants, using five-year av-
erages in the pre and post periods. Awarded applicants tend to have much higher pre onset earnings
than denied applicants. The earnings of awarded applicants decline steadily in the years leading up
to the decision, whereas rejected applicants experience a relatively small decline in earnings from
disability onset to decision.
One possible way to address the concern for selection on unobservables is to use a difference-in-
differences (DiD) approach, comparing the changes in outcomes of awarded and rejected applicants
before and after the decision. The last two columns report such DiD estimates. While the results
should be interpreted with caution, the common pre-trends in graphs (c) and (d) of Figure 1 indicate
that the DiD approach may provide more credible evidence for disposable income and consumption
than for earnings and transfers.
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In contrast to the results from the Bound approach, the DiD estimates suggest little if any impact
on disposable income or consumption from being allowed DI. This conclusion holds true when we
use the years prior the decision as the pre-treatment period (column 6), and when we compare the
outcomes after the decision to those before disability onset (column 7).
6 Concluding remarks
The stark differences between the Bound approach and the DiD analysis point to the importance
of unobservable differences between rejected and allowed applicants. To draw firm conclusions
about the impact of being allowed DI on earnings, income and consumption, it would therefore
be very useful to exploit quasi-experimental variation in the disability determination process. At
the same time, it is necessary to better understand the behavioral responses to program parameters
and the role of other insurance mechanisms, such as spouse’s labor supply, benefit substitution, and
self-insurance through savings. Improving the comparability of rejected and awarded recipients
and quantifying the extent to which DI crowds out or adds to other insurance mechanisms are
therefore important next steps in assessing the trade-off between costs and insurance aspects of the
DI program.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Data and sample selection
Our analysis employs several data sources that we can link through unique identifiers for each in-
dividual. Information on DI benefits comes from social security registers that contain complete
records for all individuals who entered the DI program during the period 1967-2010. The data set
includes information on the individual’s work history and medical diagnosis, the month when DI
was awarded (or denied), and the level of DI benefits received. We merge these data sets with ad-
ministrative registers provided by Statistics Norway, using a rich longitudinal database that covers
every resident from 1967 to 2010. For each year, it contains individual demographic information
(such as sex, age, and education).
Since 1993, we have detailed information on virtually all sources of income (such as wages,
income from self employment, capital income, cash transfers), most types of assets and durables
(such as deposits, securities, liabilities, pension plans, real estate, cars), and asset-specific returns
and rates of depreciation at a disaggregate level. We use this information to construct measures
of household consumption from the accounting identity that total expenditure in a period is equal
to to income and the change in wealth across the period. To assess the validity of the method to
impute consumption, we have checked our measures of total expenditure against those reported in
the Norwegian family expenditure surveys.
Details about the data sources and each of the variables are given in Appendix Table A.1. The
coverage and reliability of Norwegian registry data are rated as exceptional in international quality
assessments.1 Importantly, the Norwegian income and asset data has several advantages over those
available in most other countries. First, there is no attrition from the original sample because of the
need to ask permission from individuals to access their tax records. In Norway, these records are in
the public domain. Second, our income data pertains to all individuals, and not only to jobs covered
by social security. Third, incomes and assets are recorded without any top or bottom coding.
In Appendix Table A.2, we document the key characteristics of individuals who apply for DI
during the period 1998 to 2004. We split the applicants into four groups depending on allowance
decision and reapplication: Initially allowed; initially denied, no re-application; initially denied but
allowed on re-application; initially denied and denied on re-application.
In our main analysis, we focus on the first two groups of applicants, excluding individuals who
reapply within ten years of their denied DI claim. We also exclude individuals who were older
1See e.g. Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995): "Income Distributions in OECD countries: evidence from
the Luxembourg Income Study", OECD Publications and Information Center.
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than 62 years at the allowance decision (to avoid program substitution between DI and old-age
retirement schemes). Appendix Table A.3 displays summary statistics of the economic outcomes
for the main estimation sample. Note that in the graphical analysis of the outcomes of allowed and
rejected applicants over time, we exclude observations for years in which an individual is dead, has
emigrated, is younger than 18 or older than 67 (and thus ineligible for DI).
Table A.1: Data and variable description
Application data Source: FD-trygd
Decision/application Year and month of decision/application
Disability/sickness onset Year and month of disability/sickness onset
DI benefits Basic and supplemental benefit levels
Disorder Disorder classification is based on ICD-10 codes.
Individual outcomes Source: Tax registers
Annual earnings Wages and income from self-employment
Annual total transfers Taxable and nontaxable cash transfers from federal and local government
Annual individual income Sum of earnings and taxable and nontaxable cash transfers.
Individual characterics Source: National Education Database and Central Population Register
Age Age of applicant
Foreign born Indicator variable for applicant being foreign born
Children Number of children (aged less than 18) of applicant
Married Indicator variable for marital status of applicant
Household size Number of household members (spouse, cohabitant, children) of applicant
Education level Years of schooling of applicant
Household outcomes Source: Eika (2014, mimeo)
Disposable income All sources of recorded income less taxes
Consumption Total expenditure in a period = Disp. income
+ change in wealth across the period
Sources: More information about data sources can be found at "Data collections" (www.ssb.no/a/english/mikrodata_en/).
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistic of different types of applicants
Initial application Final application
No reapplication Reapplication
Allowed applicant: ! !
Rejected applicant: ! !
Age (at the time of decision) 50.42 43.44 48.74 44.20
[10.47] [10.41] [9.46] [9.48]
Female 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.58
[0.50] [0.49] [0.49] [0.49]
Married 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.47
[0.49] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50]
Foreign born 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.26
[0.25] [0.38] [0.31] [0.44]
Years of Schooling 10.92 10.23 10.36 9.30
[3.21] [4.19] [3.49] [4.59]
Children below age 18 0.41 0.98 0.60 1.02
[0.85] [1.22] [1.03] [1.30]
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.36 0.42 0.40 0.42
[0.48] [0.49] [0.49] [0.49]
Mental disorders 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.29
[0.44] [0.45] [0.46] [0.45]
Number of observations 127,050 12,802 20,445 2,514
Standard deviations [in square brackets]
Notes: This table displays means for applicants and re-applicants. The applicant sample consists of all claims made during the period 1998-2004 by
individuals who are at most 62 years of age. The sample of re-applicants (see section A.1) is a subgroup of the initially denied applicant sample.
Unless otherwise stated, all characteristics are measured the year before application. Nominal values are deflated to 2005 and represented in US
dollars using the average exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
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Table A.3: Summary statistics of economic outcomes for estimation sample
Period: 0-5 years 5-1 years 5-1 year
After Decision Before Onset Before Decision
Allowed applicant: ! ! !
Rejected applicant: ! ! !
A: Individual earnings 8.47 22.64 42.85 28.12 35.38 24.97
[11.31] [17.76] [23.15] [23.57] [23.35] [21.63]
B: Individual transfers 27.81 17.98 4.49 9.77 9.19 13.00
[10.85] [13.63] [7.69] [11.08] [10.33] [11.43]
C: Household income 32.07 25.50 31.57 24.72 31.32 24.92
[10.55] [11.23] [12.21] [11.46] [11.93] [11.43]
D: Household consumption 34.71 29.30 32.67 27.20 32.78 27.87
[15.40] [16.03] [15.99] [15.18] [14.96] [15.06]
Number of observations 128,386 12,984 116,115 12,450 130,453 13,113
Note: This table shows mean outcomes for the groups of allowed and rejected applicant for three periods: ’After decision’ is the average 0-5 years
after decision; ’before onset’ is the average 1-5 years before disability onset; ’before decision’ is the average 1-5 years prior to decision. The sample
consists of all applicants during the period 1998-2004 who did not re-apply and were at most 62 years at the time of the decsion. Household variables
are per capita, and nominal values are deflated to 2005, represented in US dollars using the average exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
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A.2 Additional figures and tables
This appendix provides additional tables and figures.
Figure A.1 shows the trends in individual income for rejected and awarded DI applicants. An-
nual individual income is the sum of total transfers and earnings (adjusted by household size to be
comparable to household disposable income in graph (c) of Figure 1 in the paper). By comparing
this figure to graph (c) in Figure 1, we can see the role of the spouse in the changes in disposable
income.
Table A.4 adds controls to the regressions reported in Table 1 of the paper.
Figure A.2 plots economic outcomes of awarded and rejected DI applicants, before disability
onset (year -8 to 1) and after the allowance decision (year 1 to 8) . In year 0, we report the mean
outcome over the period from disability onset to allowance decision.
In Figure A.3, we redo Figure 1 in the paper, except that we now look at the sample of applicants
who are initially denied, reapply and are either awarded or rejected upon reapplication. In this
figure, year 0 refers to the time of the decision on the reapplicaiton.
In Table A.5, we redo Table 1 in the paper, except that we now look at the sample of applicants
who are initially denied, reapply and are either awarded or rejected upon reapplication. In this
table, decision refers to the outcome of the reapplication.
Figure A.1: Individual income of awarded and rejected applicants, before and after DI decision
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Note: Individual income (earnings and total transfers) are adjusted for household size. Nominal values are deflated to 2005, represented in US
dollars using the average exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
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Table A.4: Awarded and rejected applicants: Differences and changes in economic outcomes, with
controls ($1,000)
Difference Changes in outcomes Difference-in-differences
Post Post decision - Post decision - Post decision -
decision pre decision pre onset pre decision pre onset
Estimation sample:
Allowed applicant: ! ! ! ! !
Rejected applicant: ! ! ! ! !
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual:
A: Earnings -14.55 -26.84 -2.31 -35.58 -4.60 -24.54 -31.00
(0.16) (0.06) (0.16) (0.07) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20)
B: Transfers 10.23 18.63 4.98 24.00 8.22 13.64 15.70
(0.12) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
Household (per capita):
C: Disposable income 2.43 0.77 0.61 0.91 1.13 0.17 -0.23
(0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
D: Consumtion 1.22 1.96 1.46 2.95 2.41 0.50 0.53
(0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.05) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
Observations 141,370 258,839 26,097 242,130 25,253 284,936 267,383
Note: In this table, we add controls to the regression results reported in Table 1 of the paper. We control for all background characteristics, listed
in Table A.2. We allow for a flexible functional form by including a large set of dummies for different values of the covariates. Standard errors (in
parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the individual level. Household variables are per capita, and nominal values are deflated
to 2005, represented in US dollars using the average exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
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Figure A.2: Economic outcomes of awarded and rejected applicants, before disability onset and
after DI decision ($1,000)
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Note: The years -8 to -1 are relative to the year of disability onset. In year 0, we report the mean outcome over the period from disability onset
to allowance decision. The years from 1 to 8 are relative to decision. Household variables are per capita, and nominal values are deflated to 2005,
represented in US dollars using the average exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
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Figure A.3: Economic outcomes of awarded and rejected re-applicants, before and after DI decision
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(b) DI benefits and total transfers
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(c) Household disposable income
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(d) Household consumption
Notes: The sample consist of applicants who are initially denied, reapply and are either awarded or rejected upon reapplication during the period
1998-2004 who were at most 62 years at the time of the decision. Household variables are per capita, and nominal values are deflated to 2005,
represented in US dollars using the average exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
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Table A.5: Awarded and rejected re-applicants: Differences and changes in economic outcomes
($1,000)
Difference Changes in outcomes Difference-in-differences
Post Post decision - Post decision - Post decision -
decision pre decision pre onset pre decision pre onset
Estimation sample:
Allowed re-applicant: ! ! ! ! !
Rejected re-applicant: ! ! ! ! !
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual:
A: Earnings -11.05 -20.98 -1.97 -27.16 1.47 -19.01 -28.63
(0.34) (0.15) (0.40) (0.18) (0.39) (0.43) (0.43)
B: Transfers 7.68 14.99 4.08 18.63 3.20 10.91 15.43
(0.27) (0.10) (0.30) (0.10) (0.28) (0.32) (0.30)
Household (per capita):
C: Disposable income 5.61 1.86 1.48 1.40 1.70 0.38 -0.29
(0.22) (0.06) (0.18) (0.08) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
D: Consumtion 5.52 2.91 1.88 3.08 2.41 1.03 0.68
(0.31) (0.12) (0.34) (0.14) (0.29) (0.36) (0.32)
Observations 23,205 39,944 4,975 37,571 5,097 44,919 42,668
Note: This table shows differences in mean outcomes across the groups of allowed and rejected re-applicants; within group changes in outcomes
before and after decision, and difference-in-difference across groups and time. The sample consist of applicants who are initially denied, reapply
and are either awarded or rejected upon reapplication during the period 1998-2004. We restrict the sample to applicants who were at most 62 years
at the time of the decision on the reapplication. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the individual level.
Household variables are per capita, and nominal values are deflated to 2005, represented in US dollars using the average exchange rate $/NOK = 6.
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